A central government facing separatist activities adopts various policies to respond to them. In some cases, the government represses them harshly, while in other cases, it tries to accommodate the separatists' demands. We currently have two strands in the literature to understand which policies are implemented by the government: the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model. However, neither of them is sufficient to explain Indonesia's policies toward its separatists in Aceh and Papua following democratization. Indonesia's policies toward separatists have been drifting between accommodation and repression. To understand these policy shifts, this paper emphasizes the importance of the inner workings of the central government, introducing two variables: the preferences of national leaders and the existence of veto players. This paper demonstrates that these perspectives are essential in order to fully explain the Indonesian government's policies toward its separatists.
4 states, such as Indonesia, do not concede to separatists. Indonesian policies do not match the cost-benefit calculation model, either. Yudhoyono sought peace talks with the Acehnese even before the tsunami in December, 2004, when the cost from the Aceh war was probably at its lowest since 1999. How can we explain these differing policies?
To understand the different policies of the successive presidents of Indonesia, this paper emphasizes the importance of the inner workings of central government. It introduces two variables to explain governmental policy shifts: the preferences of national leaders and the existence of veto players. Firstly, by carefully reanalyzing the results of Walter's (2009, Chapter 3) experiment on reputation building, this paper contends that there are two types of people by nature: one who acts based on the short-term cost-benefit calculation, and one who acts based on the long-term cost-benefit calculation. Their preferences are different. The former tends to accommodate separatists if the cost from separatist warfare is high. In contrast, committing to reputation building, the latter tends to fight separatists without accommodation, fearing concession will lead to greater demands from other ethnic groups. This paper assumes that among politicians, the preference of national leaders, such as the president or prime minister, affects policies on separatists the most.
Secondly, this paper incorporates the idea of veto players, who can prevent policies from changing. The national leader's preferences do not always directly and entirely dominate policy course. Because a central government is not a unitary actor, veto players might exist inside central government (Tsebelis 2002) , preventing the national leader from enforcing their preferred policies. This paper demonstrates that considering the preference of national leaders and the existence of veto players is imperative to fully explaining the policy shifts of the Indonesian government. 5 This paper proceeds as follows; after introducing the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model in more detail, it develops the main argument. Then, it provides background information on Indonesian political institutions and the separatist movements. From then on, Indonesia's policies toward Aceh and Papua are scrutinized.
A conclusion follows.
Revisiting the Debate

The Reputation Theory and the Cost-Benefit Calculation Model
According to the reputation theory, multi-ethnic states are unlikely to concede to separatists because concession prompts other ethnic groups to demand the same status. Toft (2003) argues that multi-ethnic states fight against separatists, fearing accommodation might set a precedent. Walter (2006 Walter ( , 2009 develops the reputation theory in the context of wars of self-determination. According to Walter, if states offer accommodation to separatists, other ethnic groups might also demand the same privileges. In contrast, if such demands are harshly resisted, potential separatists are deterred. Thus, states must take the incentive to deter potential challengers by disguising themselves as tough fighters. In particular, when many ethnic groups coexist in one country, politicians have a strong incentive to build a reputation for not conceding to separatists. That is why governments in multi-ethnic countries adamantly refuse concessions to separatists. Yet, there have been statistical analyses skeptical about the reputation theory, too (Nilsson 2010; Forsberg 2013 ).
The cost-benefit calculation model is another influential model for understanding how wars end (Wittman, 1979; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999; Zartman 2000; Bapat, 2005) . This model suggests that a central government 6 accommodates separatists, as long as the cost from separatist warfare is high, even in a multi-ethnic country. In other words, while the reputation theory is more concerned about the long-term cost-benefit calculation, a cost-benefit calculation model is concerned about the short-term cost-benefit calculation.
Incorporating the Internal Workings of Governments
These two theories generally assume that a central government is a unitary actor.
Instead, this paper develops its argument incorporating the internal workings of central governments, thus presenting a more nuanced theory than the two above. Firstly, based on the close analysis of Walter's (2009, Chapter 3) laboratory experiment, this paper argues that there are two types of people by nature in the world. One type only considers the short-term cost by continuing separatist warfare, while the other type is more worried about the long-term cost by conceding to separatists. Walter's (2009, 41-65) chapter on laboratory experiments (coauthored with Dustin Tingley) does support this argument rather than the reputation theory. Walter's experiment is based on the chain store model (42). Simply put, some were assigned the role of a central government which loses more by fighting against separatists in the short term. Participants could choose whether to fight against separatists or not, but based on the long-term cost-benefit calculation, they were expected to always fight to deter new separatists from entrance. However, some of those assigned this role chose not to fight in these situations, apparently only considering the short-term benefits (60-63).
１ Walter had to conclude that 'the laboratory experiments confirm important parts of the reputation theory, but also reveal where human beings are likely to deviate from existing expectations about rational behavior' (65). More precisely, this laboratory 7 experiment suggested that there were two types of participants. Some participants acted as the reputation theory predicts. In contrast, other participants were only considering the short-term cost and benefit.
Thus, it appears that two types of people exist by nature. They have different preferences. For the sake of convenience, this paper terms those considering the long-term cost and benefit as hardliners and those considering the short-term cost and benefit as softliners. This is because those intending to deter other potential separatist challengers would not agree to settle the warfare, while those focusing on only short-term costs might settle a warfare if that war is costly. In other words, hardliners repress separatists without accommodation, as the reputation theory predicts. In contrast, softliners tend to accommodate separatists, as the cost-benefit calculation model predicts, but even softliners do not have incentives to concede much to demands from weak separatists.
Indeed, these types correspond not only to the two rational choice theories but also to the two arguments regarding the effects of offering autonomy. Some argue that accommodation of separatists' demands only strengthens their capability and willingness to secede. Cornell (2002) finds that the institutionalization of territorial autonomy increases both the willingness and the capacity to act for separatism. Hardline politicians agree with Cornell. This is another reason hardliners prefer repressing separatist movements without accommodation.
Others argue that granting autonomy can help end separatism. Segmental autonomy is one of the characteristics of Lijphart's (1977) consociational democracy. Horowitz (2000, 628) (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 10) .
The distinction between softliners and hardliners implies that the type of policy-maker strongly affects conflict outcomes. Among many politicians, the preference of national leaders affects policies the most. The executive branch usually negotiates and concludes peace treaties with rebels. Moreover, the national leader is likely to exercise considerable influence over policies dealing with separatists, because it is usually an important part of their agenda.
However, national leaders cannot always dominate the decision-making process.
If there is a veto player inside the government (Tsebelis 2002) , it is impossible for national leaders to implement their preferred policies without the consent of the veto player. If the executive is to reach and maintain a peace agreement, it is necessary for them to rein in those against peace, including veto players.
Thus, this paper argues that two additional factors are necessary to explain government policies toward separatists. The first factor is whether the leader of the central government is a softliner or a hardliner. The second factor is whether there is a veto player opposed to the policies of the national leader. The government cannot enforce its policies without the consent of the veto player. Wahid and Megawati were in opposition, but while Megawati was fiercely against the separation of East Timor, Wahid argued that a referendum was the best way to handle this issue (Kompas, 1999a 
Methodology
Background to the Conflicts in Aceh and Papua
The TNI as an Informal Veto Player
In the context of Indonesia's policies toward Aceh and Papua, there is one potential veto player: the Indonesian national military (TNI). ２ The TNI still retains political influence in the form of 'the veto power for defending the national unity' (Honna 2009, 227) . The TNI is an informal veto player in that it does not have the right institutionally to veto government policies. It is not impossible for presidents to rein in the TNI by intervening in its personnel rotation or by pressurising the military with backing from public opinion.
The TNI has generally been against accommodation. The TNI's current ideological basis is Indonesian national unity (NKRI), 'a non-negotiable, absolute value' for the TNI (Honna 2009, 238) . In addition, the TNI had political interests in the conflicts continuing in Aceh and Papua. Ending separatist wars would not only lead to the loss of political influence (ICG 2001a, 14) , but also leave the TNI under stronger pressure for military reform.
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The TNI had an economic interest in conflicts, too. In Aceh, it operated many informal and even illegal businesses, including the drug trade (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006) . Likewise, in Papua, Perlez and Bonner (2005) reveal that Freeport, a multi-national company mining copper and gold in Papua, contributed more than $20 million to the military and the police between 1998 and 2004. Overall, the TNI had every reason to oppose accommodative policies toward Aceh and Papua.
Background to the Conflicts in Aceh and Papua
The Free Aceh Movement's (GAM) rebellion began in Aceh in 1976, aiming for the independence of Aceh. Its leader, Hasan di Tiro, espoused Acehnese nationalism, emphasizing its history and believing that Aceh had the legal right to independence (Aspinall 2009, Chapter 3) . GAM relied on the rhetoric of how natural resources in Aceh were exploited by Jakarta to capture the support from local people for independence (Sulistiyanto 2001, 439-440; Ross 2005, 53 ). Yet, the first rebellion was easily crushed by the Indonesian military. When GAM started another rebellion in 1989, the military engaged in counterinsurgency operations, making the province a Military
Operations Area (DOM) and committing massive human rights violations (Aspinall 2009, 111-112) .
When Habibie became president in 1998 and started democratization, the Acehnese demanded justice. The media began to report the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the military during DOM. Urban Acehnese, who had not known much about the atrocities until then, started to insist on punishing the perpetrators (Aspinall 2009, 127) . Habibie initially tried to respond to the Acehnese demands. Yet, as GAM came back to Aceh, the TNI restrengthened its operations in 12 1999 (Sukma 2004, 12-13) . Massacres, tortures, and shootings of civilians by the TNI or police force subsequently took place, which only strengthened Acehnese grievances against Jakarta (Miller 2009, 30-31) . According to an opinion poll by a Medan-based newspaper, 56 percent of Acehnese already preferred to hold an independence referendum in June 1999 (Miller 2009, 37) . Aceh where 500,000 people took part (Miller 2009, 66) . However, freedom of speech and assembly began to be restricted in 2000 and the TNI repressed another rally in November, 2000. Internationally, the pressure to end the conflict started to increase as the war intensified. For example, in May, 2001, the ambassador of the United States went to Aceh to declare his support for negotiation (Kompas, 2001 ).
In Papua, pressure to resolve the issues mainly took the form of political protests, 
Wahid's Changing Policies toward Aceh and Papua
Abdurrahman Wahid was 'a man with a philosophical commitment to the peaceful resolution of communal conflict' (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 8-9) . Even before the Habibie administration offered the East Timorese the opportunity for independence in January, 1999, Wahid privately told Jamsheed Marker, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in East Timor, that he was not opposed to the independence of East Timor (Marker 2003, 113) . When the government announced its policy change regarding East Timor, Wahid publicly supported a referendum (Kompas, 1999a) . Concerning Aceh, too, Wahid agreed with the idea of holding a referendum on independence before being elected (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 9) . Considering Wahid was a softliner, this explains his initial accommodative policies. In addition, Wahid initially had the power to rein in the TNI. He himself was elected democratically for the first time in more than 40 years and his cabinet included members from most of the political parties. In contrast, the TNI was still suffering from its loss of international reputation during the East Timor referendum (Mietzner 2006, 19) .
Wahid implemented accommodative policies toward Aceh, although the independence referendum never took place. Facing pressure from the DPR, he had to clarify that he would not tolerate any movement toward the independence of Aceh (Kompas, 1999b ). Yet, Wahid promised to investigate past human rights abuses. 24 15 low-ranking officers were prosecuted with regard to the killing of ulama Bantaqiah and his 52 students (Miller 2009, 69) . He also withdrew non-organic troops.
Crucially, Wahid was the first president to initiate peace talks with GAM. When the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a newly-formed NGO in Geneva, offered mediation, both Wahid and GAM decided to participate in the dialogue. They reached a cease-fire agreement in May, 2000, despite the opposition from the TNI and some civilian politicians. The number of victims from violence lessened initially, but violence escalated again around the end of August (Miller 2009, 77-82; Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 14-18) . The violence was mostly perpetrated by the TNI and the police, although GAM also violated the cease-fire (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 18) . 
Megawati's Repressive Policies
Megawati was a hardliner. When Megawati became president after the impeachment of Wahid, she declared six national goals, among which to maintain national unity was the top priority (Miller 2009, 105) . Megawati 'defined herself as the guardian of the nationalist legacy bestowed upon Indonesia by her father, Indonesia's first president,
Sukarno' (McGibbon 2004, 43). She had also been against the independence of East
Timor in the past (Kompas, 1999a Minister Hari Sabarno were also skeptical about regional autonomy (Miller 2009, 103) .
Overall, the Megawati administration was dominated by hardliners.
In addition, Megawati had no will to rein in the TNI, an informal veto player.
Three reasons were behind this. Firstly, she did not trust civilian leaders who supported her ascent to the presidency, because they had once prevented her from becoming President in 1999. Lacking confidence in civilian leaders, she wanted to secure military support (Mietzner 2006, 34-35) . Secondly, she might have learned from Wahid's fall that trying to interfere in the TNI would risk her political life (Honna 2009, 240) . The CoHA soon collapsed. Although violence lessened significantly in the first two months after the CoHA was signed, gradually both GAM and the TNI started to violate the agreement. Although GAM was not necessarily sincere in abiding by the CoHA (Schulze 2004, 49-54) , it was the TNI that actively undermined the peace process.
Firstly, demilitarization of GAM was supposed to coincide with a 'phased relocation of TNI forces which [would] reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a defensive force' (Article 3.b); HDC 2002). However, General Ryamizard Ryacudu insisted that whether he increased his troops in Aceh or not was his own business (Kompas, 2003) .
Indeed, the TNI increased their number of soldiers from 22,000 in February to 26,000 in April (Siboro 2003; Jakarta Post 2003b) .
Secondly and more importantly, the TNI seemed to even coordinate demonstrations against the JSC covertly. On March 3, 2002 a JSC office in Central
Aceh was attacked by a mob insisting GAM was their enemy. The attack was not prevented by the TNI or the police. In fact, it was believed that members from the Army Strategic Reserve Command participated in the protest (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 41; Jakarta Post, 2003a) . Besides, in that area, rumor had it that the TNI trained and gave weapons to Javanese transmigrants to form a militia (Miller 2009, 123) . Similar attacks ensued, which forced the JSC to withdraw to Banda Aceh.
When the Megawati administration saw a breakdown of peace, it was easily convinced that no more dialogue was necessary. During the next negotiations in May, GAM conceded significantly so that the peace process would not collapse. However, the administration demanded that GAM accept the special autonomy law entirely (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 44) . GAM could not accept such demands tantamount to surrender (Unidjaja, 2003) . The peace talks collapsed, and martial law was declared in Aceh the 21 following day. The immediate imposition and the swift operation suggest that the government attended the peace talks in May to satisfy international audiences with no intention of continuing the peace process (Miller 2009, 124; Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 45) . The peace process came to an end without any concrete offer of further autonomy by the Megawati administration.
Even the special autonomy law was only partially implemented in Aceh. soldier (ICG 2003, 6) , but the answer to the question as to whether higher-ranking officers were involved was not sought (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 34) . Kopassus officers involved in the assassination were tried and sentenced, but only given light sentences of up to 42 months (Jakarta Post 2003c) . General Ryamizard Ryacudu even praised these officers as 'heroes' (Cooney 2003) . The government's management of the assassination was far from satisfactory for Papuans. However, Chauvel and Bhakti (2004, 39) point out that 'the weight of the argument, in the internal government documents, is that partition will undermine the independence movement'. Indeed, the partition was ordered without the approval of the MRP and the Papuan parliament, which was necessary under the special autonomy law (ICG 2003, 7 ).
Megawati's policies were fundamentally repressive. Although it is true that she implemented some provisions of the special autonomy law, including revenue-sharing, these were promised before she became president. In fact, she did not implement other provisions regulated by the law. The CoHA was the only accommodative policy the Megawati administration was actively involved in. However, the CoHA was only possible because of international pressure and the central government's expectation that GAM would acquiesce to special autonomy, a concession the central government had 23 already offered. During the CoHA process, the Megawati administration never offered any specific new concessions to GAM so that it could end the conflict honorably. Then, Megawati was easily convinced that dialogue was ineffective when the TNI was actively undermining the cease-fire. In May, 2003, by issuing martial law, the administration showed its willingness to crush GAM militarily without further accommodation. Megawati also tried to undermine the Papuan separatist movement without new concessions. As in Aceh, she did not implement the special autonomy law fully. Overall, the Megawati administration, led by a hardliner, was not accommodative to the separatists. 
Yudhoyono's Accommodative Policies toward Aceh and Papua
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had been regarded as a softliner. Serving as a cabinet minister during the Wahid and Megawati administrations, Yudhoyono had emphasized a non-military approach to Aceh (Aspinall and Crouch 2003) . During the presidential election campaign, Yudhoyono emphasized the peaceful resolution of separatist conflicts, telling Papuan leaders that he would fully implement the special autonomy law (ICG 2006b, 4) . New Vice President Jusuf Kalla had also been involved in solving conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi (Mietzner 2012, 98) . Kalla had tried to reopen negotiations with GAM after martial law was imposed (Aspinall 2005, 18; Morfit 2007, 120; Patria, Suud and Meuko 2005, 85) . The new administration was led by softliners (Schulze 2005, 24 ).
In addition, unlike Wahid, Yudhoyono was able to control a potential veto player:
hardliners in the TNI. Yudhoyono (2014, 281) Yudhoyono also terminated the careers of other conservative figures in the TNI (Mietzner 2006, 49-50) . General Sutarto, trusted by Yudhoyono, made it clear that TNI officers were not allowed to object to Yudhoyono's policies (Morfit 2007, 131-132; Mietzner 2012, 99) . When the peace agreement was signed, Sutarto flew to Banda Aceh to show the TNI's support of it (Tanuredjo 2005 ).
Yudhoyono's ability to contain opposition to peace in the TNI derived from two sources. Firstly, he had strong legitimacy. Yudhoyono won the direct presidential election, gaining more than 60 percent of votes in the second round. Secondly, Yudhoyono's background as the TNI General helped him. Yudhoyono recalled, 'I knew my audience' (Morfit 2007, 132) . He knew that the majority of the TNI, particularly the young, were 'moderates' (Morfit 2007, 132) . Understanding the TNI's economic interest in warfare, Yudhoyono's government also distributed funds totalling around US$50 million to the TNI as it withdrew from Aceh, and let them be involved in the development industry in Aceh after the end of the conflict (Mietzner 2012, 106) .
Moreover, Yudhoyono was 'generally more highly respected by the TNI than his civilian counterparts' (Miller 2009, 160 ).
In addition, Vice President Jusuf Kalla played a crucial role in conflict resolution in Aceh (Schulze 2005, 24; Al Qurtuby 2015, 139) . Kalla was a softliner who 'made calculations in terms of the costs and benefits of continuing the war' (Awaluddin 2008, 26) , according to Hamil Awaluddin, the chief negotiator on the government side. Kalla's continuous search for contact with GAM after the collapse of the CoHA process 26 eventually led to the new peace negotiations in 2005 (Patria, Suud and Meuko, 2005, 85) . Kalla backed up the negotiations in Jakarta, publicly defended them, and supervised the government side (Aspinall 2005, 35-37) Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland and an internationally-known mediator, before the tsunami (Aspinall 2005, 19) . This suggests it is impossible to solely attribute the end of the conflict in Aceh to the tsunami (Morfit 2007, 117-118) .
During the peace talks, both parties made significant concessions. On the one hand, the Yudhoyono administration allowed the creation of local political parties in Aceh. In Indonesia, a political party has to have a nation-wide organization. Indonesian elites believed that the regulation was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the multi-ethnic country (Aspinall 2005, 38) . Therefore, the government initially resisted the demand for local political parties in Aceh (Aspinall 2005, 37-42) On the other hand, GAM dropped its claim for independence. Three reasons were behind this. Firstly, the tsunami was certainly an important factor. Malik Mahmoud, GAM's 'Prime Minister', recalls, 'After the tsunami the situation is different. Now it is better for Aceh that we no longer strive for independence' (Merikallio 2006, 87) .
Secondly, the TNI's operations had already weakened GAM (Schulze 2005 23-24 ).
Thirdly, ambassadors from countries such as the US, Japan, Australia and Malaysia pressurized GAM negotiators to accept the territorial integrity of Indonesia (Kingsbury 2006, 34) . The Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) was established in 2011 to ensure the development of Papua with special autonomy funds ICG 2012, 23) . While UP4B initially tried to help solve the political problems Papua faced, it was soon forced to focus on development because of pressure from conservatives (ICG 2012, 24 Yudhoyono (2014, 703-708) boasted of how he effectively undermined international support for Papuans.
The analysis above reveals that the extent of accommodation Yudhoyono offered to the Papuans, was much less than the one offered to the Acehnese. The Jakarta Post (Davidson, 2016) . Although whether the emphasis on the right to self-determination will continue in the 21 st century is unclear (Griffiths 2014) , these international pressures might eventually become another 'pebble in the shoe' for Indonesia (Alatas 2006) . At that point, it is likely that Widodo will try in earnest to solve the conflict, but the question as to whether he will 32 become a second Wahid or a second Yudhoyono remains to be seen.
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The two exit interview responses suggest this (Walter 2009, 61-62) . Indeed, Figure  3 .8 in Walter (61) suggests that a substantial number of the participants regularly avoided fighting (60). ２ For comparative analyses of the TNI with other Southeast Asian countries' military forces, see Beeson, Bellamy, and Hughes (2006) and Heiduk (2011 ４ Organic troops refer to troops originally stationed in the local area and non-organic troops refer to those not originally stationed there.
